According to the rule of strict liability, if a person brings on his land and keeps there any dangerous thing, that is, a thing which is likely to do mischief if it escapes from the land, he will be prima facie answerable for the damage caused by its escape even though he had not been negligent in keeping it there. The liability arises not because there was any fault or negligence on the part of a person but because he has kept some dangerous thing on his land and the same has escaped from there and thus caused damage. Since in such a case the liability arises even without any negligence or fault on the part of the defendant, it is known as the rule of Strict liability.
In the cases of the strict
liability, the liability is imposed on the defendants irrespective of the
considerations of their mental state. The liability is not based on the blame
worthiness. Even the innocent persons are held liable for the harm caused to
others on the account of escape of things from their land.
For the application of the rule, 3
elements or essentials should be there, which are as follows:
a) Dangerous
thing:- For the application of the rule of the strict liability, some
dangerous thing must be brought by the person on his land.
b) Escape:- For
the application of the rule of the strict liability, there must be an escape of
the dangerous thing or object from the land of the defendant.
c) Non
natural use of the land:- For the application of the rule of the
strict liability, there must be non natural use of the defendant’s land.
The important cases of
the strict liability can be classified as follows:
1. Rule in the Rylands vs. Fletcher;
2. Liability for Dangerous Operations;
3. Liability for Animals;
4. Liability for Dangerous chattels;
5. Liability for Dangerous Structures and Premises.
Rule in the Rylands vs.
Fletcher:-
The principle of the case, Rylands
vs. Fletcher is against the fault liability. The facts of this
leading case were as follows:
'In the above mentioned case, the
plaintiff, Rylands employed the independent contractors or the engineers who
were apparently competent to construct a reservoir on his land. In the course
of this work the contractors came up on some old shafts and the passages on
Rylands’ land. They communicated with the mines of Fletcher’s, a neighbour of
Rylands, but no one suspected this for they appeared to be filled with the
earth. The contractors did not block them properly and when the reservoir was
filled, the water from it burst through the old shafts and flooded the mines of
Fletcher. It was found as a fact that while Rylands had not been negligent, the
contractors had been negligent. Thus Fletcher sued Rylands and the House of
Lords held the latter liable.'
The rule of the Law is that the
person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps
there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril
and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damages which is
the natural consequence of its escape. A person will be held liable only if the
injury has been caused to the plaintiff in consequence of the escape of the
mischievous substance.
Where there is no such escape,
there is no liability.
This new rule had really made
substantial progress on earlier English law in two branches:
1. In
the matter of imposing the liability on the occupiers of land for the escape of
the things from their premises.
2. In
the matter of the classes of persons for whose defaults in the connection with
such escape the occupier is vicariously responsible.
As to one, the
court took a rule of liability which had been more or less clearly perceived in
connection with the escape of a fire, cattle or unruly beasts, and extended it
to the escape of mischievous things generally.
As to two, they
laid down that the occupier from whose land these things escaped and did damage
is liable not only for the default of his servant but also for that of an
independent contractor and for that of anyone except a stranger.
The doctrine of Rylands
vs. Fletcher was limited to the operation of the source of the
danger brought by a person on his land; and if it caused damage outside the
limits of his land to the person or the property of a neighbour the owner of
the premises is not liable.
· Exception to the Rule:-
The rule in Rylands vs.
Fletcher has so many exceptions. When stated without the exceptions it
is a rule of absolute liability but there are so many exceptions to it that it
is doubtful whether there is much of the rule left. The main exceptions of the
rule in Rylands vs. Fletcher are as follows:
1. Damage
due to the natural user of land:-
In the judgment given by the
House of the Lords in the case of Rylands vs. Fletcher, making
a distinction between the natural user and the non natural user of the land, it
was held that is applicable only to the non natural user of the land.
The Ball case or Bolton vs.
Stone:
In the above mentioned case, it
was held that playing cricket on the land was a natural use of the land. In the
above case, the plaintiff, Miss Stone, while standing on the highway outside
her house, was hit by a cricket ball and thus sustained serious injuries. She
sued the members of the club for damages. But her suit for the damages was
dismissed by the House of Lords on the ground that the members of the club were
not liable in damages, either for the negligence or for the nuisance.
Another example under this
section is that if I light a fire to burn the rubbish on a calm day in the
middle of my field, that is a natural use of my property but if I light a fire
in my garden, one yard to the windward of my neighbour’s hay stack, that is non
natural use of the land. If the harm ensues, then I am liable for
that.
2. Things
naturally on the land and not essentially dangerous:-
In respect of the things
naturally on the land, the principle has no application.
Noble vs. Harrison:
In the
above mention case, it was held that the defendant was not liable for the
injuries caused to the plaintiff by the branch of an apparently good tree in
the defendant’s land.
Giles vs. Walker:
In the above mentioned case, it
had been held that an occupier of the land was not bound to prevent the growth
of the thistles down to the land of his neighbour.
Pontardawe R D C vs. Moore Gwyn:
In the above mentioned case, it
had been held that a land owner was not liable in respect of the rocks on his
land which owing to the weathering were breaking away and thus causing damage
to the persons in a valley beneath, since they were the part of a natural
formation and their presence was not due to the quarrying or any other
operation.
Caminer vs. Northern and London
Investment Trust Ltd.:
In the above mentioned case, it
had been held that the defendants could not be held liable either for the
negligence or for nuisance for the injury caused by the fall of an elm tree
from the defendant’s land on the plaintiff’s, and their car which was going
along a road by the side of the defendant’s land. The tree was not dangerous
and hence the defendants were held not liable.
3. Consent
of the Plaintiff:-
This exception was merely the
illustration of the principle of the maxim ‘Volenti non fit injuria’,
as where the plaintiff has either expressly or impliedly agreed to the bringing
in of some dangerous substance on his land which happens to cause the injury to
him subsequently.
Black Glass Emporium vs. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd.:
In the above mentioned case, the
facts were as follows: the water escaping from the upper floor damaged the
lower floor in a multi storied building. It was held that the strict liability
rule laid down in the famous case of Rylands vs. Fletcher was
inapplicable in this case as there was an implied consent by the occupier of
the lower floor to normal use of water by the occupier of the upper floor.
4. Common
Benifit:-
Where the injury is caused to the
plaintiff from a thing which is maintained in the premises for the common
benefit of the both parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, the latter, that
is the defendant, will not be held liable for the damage or injuries caused by
such a way.
Carstairs vs. Taylor:
In the above mentioned case, it
had been held that, the defendant, the occupant of the upper storey of a
building, was held not liable to the plaintiff, the occupant of the lower
storey, for damages caused to him by the escape of water from a water box in
the upper storey. A rat had gnawed a hole in the box which caused the leakage
of the water.
Anderson vs. Oppenheimer:
In the above mentioned case, it
had been held that, where the plaintiffs were the lessees of a floor of ‘X’s
house. A cistern in the house burst and flooded the floor. ‘X’ was held not
liable on the ground that the cistern was maintained for the common benefit of
both the parties, the plaintiff and the defendant, and the other tenants of the
other floors.
5. Act
of a Stranger:-
The rule in Rylands
vs. Fletcher is not applicable to the damage due to the act of
a stranger. Thus if a trespasser lights a fire on my land, I am not liable if
it burns my neighbour’s property, unless with the knowledge of its existence I
have failed to extinguish it within a reasonable time. If the harm was due to
the act of a stranger the rule does not apply.
Box vs. Jubb:
In the above mentioned case, it
had been held that, an overflow from the defendant’s reservoir was thus caused
by a stranger and the defendant was held not liable for the loss or damage or
injury caused to the plaintiff.
6. Statutory
Authority:-
The rule in the case of Rylands
vs. Fletcher can be excluded by the statute.
Green vs. Chelsea Water Works
Co.:
In the above mentioned case, it
had been held that, a main belonging to a waterworks company which was
authorised by the Parliament to lay the main, burst without negligence on the
part of the company and the plaintiff’s premises were flooded. The company was
held not liable for the damage or injury caused.
7. Exemption
from the liability for the Catastrophies of the nature:-
The rule in the case of Rylands
vs. Fletcher can be exempted from the liability for the
catastrophies of the nature such as the extra ordinary rainfall or a storm or a
lightning.
8. Default
of the Plaintiff:-
If a person knows that there is a
danger of his mine being flooded by his neighbour’s operation on the adjacent
land and courts the danger by doing some act which renders the flooding
probable he cannot complain.
Ponting vs. Noakes:
In the above mentioned case, the
plaintiff’s horse reached over the defendant’s boundary nibbled some poisonous
tree there and then died. Accordingly it was held that the plaintiff could
recover nothing for the damage which was due to the horse’s own intrusion.
If the injury due to the escape
of a noxious thing would not have occurred but for the unusual sensitiveness of
the plaintiff’s property, the defendant may not be liable.
Hoare and Co vs. McAlpine:
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